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Vol. 23 ▪ No. 3     ISSN 1083–9194  www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/EAP.html    Fall ▪ 2012 
his EAP completes 23 years. We enclose a 
renewal form and appreciate prompt 
responses so there will be fewer reminders 
to send in the winter 2013 issue.  As some 
readers know, we have decided to distribute EAP in 
digital, open-source format available at the website 
above and at the alternative website listed on the back 
page. In this sense, EAP is now ―free,‖ though we 
continue to have editing, printing, and distribution 
expenses. We will continue to mail paper copies to 
subscribers. We would appreciate that readers 
continue to subscribe or donate. 
 Three of the four entries this issue discuss 
―architectural phenomenology‖—its professional and 
academic past as well as its scholarly future. One 
major focus is architectural theorist Jorge Otero-
Pailos’ 2010 Architecture’s Historical Turn, which 
argues that architectural phenomenology played a 
key role in establishing American Architecture pro-
grams as viable university units of scholarly re-
search. EAP Editor David Seamon and French archi-
tectural historian Benoît Jacquet review Otero-
Pailos‘ book. Seamon examines Otero-Pailos‘ claims 
in regard to broader trends in architectural and envi-
ronmental phenomenology, and Benoît places the 
book in relation to French academic developments. 
We also include architect Reza Shirazi’s essay 
evaluating the present state of phenomenology and 
architecture. Shirazi seeks to locate an accurate 
description of current phenomenological research 
and concludes that the most precise label is 
―discourse‖—i.e.,  a mode of study and design 
initiated mostly by individual researchers and 
designers who share ―some common concerns and 
intentions‖ and ―interpret the possibilities and results 
of phenomenological investigation in a wide array of 
ways, both conceptually and practically.‖ 
 The last essay in this issue is educator John 
Cameron’s ―eighth letter from Far South,‖ which 
considers attention as it relates to place—in this case, 
Cameron‘s  rural home on Tasmania‘s Bruny Island. 
 
Below: Architect Jean Labutut’s sequence of pastel sketches 
depicting the visual movement of ―The World and the Cathe-
dral,‖ a  water-and-light spectacle created for the ―Lagoon of 
Nations‖ a  fountain he designed for the 1939 New York 
World’s Fair; from Otero-Pailos’ Architecture‘s Historical 
Turn, p. 49—see pp. 3–10. 
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Items of Interest 
The 34th annual Humanities and Technology As-
sociation Conference will be held at Maryland‘s  
Bowie State University, October 4–6, 2012. The 
Humanities and Technology Association is an 
interdisciplinary scholarly society examining the 
impact of technology on human life from a broad 
range of perspectives. gsochan@bowiestate.edu. 
 
The conference, Experiencing Light 2012, will be 
held November 12–13, 2012, in Eindhoven, the 
Netherlands. The central focus is the relationship 
between light and lighting design on human well 
being. www.experiencinglight.nl. 
 
The conference, Place and Displacement, will be 
held at Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia, 
November 21–23, 2012. www.communityidentity.com.au. 
 
The conference, Time, Space, and Body, will be 






 annual conference of the Society for Phe-
nomenology and Media (SPM) will be held in 
Puebla, México, February 20–23, 2013. 
www.wix.com/societyphenmedia/socphenmedia. 
 
Bollnow’s Human Space 
After much delay, the German philosopher Otto 
Bollnow’s influential Human Space is finally 
available in English translation published by 
London‘s Hype Press. Originally released in 
German as Mensch und Raum in 1963, this book is 
a phenomenology of space as experienced, partly 
through Bollnow‘s own observations and partly 
through reference to other phenomenologists, in-
cluding Bachelard, Eliade, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, Minkowski, and Straus. 
The book‘s first chapter examines the experi-
enced nature of space, and the second and third 
chapters consider the lived dialectic between ―the 
wide world‖ and ―the security of the house.‖ The 
fourth chapter considers various experienced as-
pects of space, including night vs. day, moods of 
space, and the spatiality of ―human coexistence.‖ 
The last chapter explores the ―spatiality of human 
life‖ and emphasizes the lived space of body, house, 
and ―free expression.‖ The sidebar, below, repro-
duces Otto‘s last-chapter summary of the ―modes of 
human space‖ as he examines them in the book.  
 
 
Modes of Human Space 
Concerning the question of the relationship of man 
[sic] with space or his attitude to space, in the course 
of discussion various successive forms have emerged, 
which are not mutually exclusive but rather overlap 
each other and are possible in combination with each 
other, and which one can thus designate as modifica-
tions of human spatiality. It therefore seems appro-
priate, in conclusion, to put them together once more 
in a schematic simplification. 
      1. First there is a naïve trust in space, a childish 
sense of shelter, which can then continue in later life 
as a natural or thoughtless sense of shelter in one‘s 
house and home. Here we are merged with our space, 
directly incarnated in it. 
      2. Secondly there is a state of homelessness or 
houselessness. Here space manifests itself in its un-
canniness and strangeness. We feel lost in this space. 
      3. This results in, third, the task of reconstructing 
security by building a house, as discussed in detail in 
the third part of this book. Through this a sheltering 
inner space is created, separated from the outside 
world. Menacing space does not disappear as a result, 
it is only pushed out of the centre and to the side. 
      4. But because every house created by humans 
provides to be tangible (and because, further, menac-
ing space still continues to lurk, hidden, even within 
the house), a further final task arises to overcome 
once more the withdrawal into a fixed housing and to 
regain a final security in a space which is no longer 
the individual space of the house, based on man, but 
overall space in general. 
      We must therefore, beyond the rigid appearance 
of an artificially created and always deceptive securi-
ty, reach the other, open security in which naïve spa-
tiality is reconstructed on a higher level. But to reach 
this is not easy and demands from us the special ef-
fort of freeing ourselves from the deceptive security. 
 
—Otto Bollnow, Human Space, pp. 285–86. 
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Benoît Jacquet & Vincent Giraud, eds., 
2012. From the Things Themselves: Archi-
tecture and Phenomenology. Kyoto: Kyoto 
Univ. Press; Seattle: Univ. of Wash. Press. 
 
The 21 chapters of this volume were presentations at the 2
nd
 
Phenomenology and Architecture conference, held in Kyoto, 
Japan, in 2010. Contributors include Ross Anderson, Karan 
August, Jason Crow, Sylvain De Bleeckere, Hubert L. Drey-
fus, Fujimori Terunobu, Phoebe Giannisi, Karsten Harries, 
Lena Hopsch, Takashi Kakuni, Rachel McCann, Santiago de 
Orduña, Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Fernando Quesada, Gilad 
Ronnen, Adam Sharr, Kiyoshi Sey Takeyama, Dermott Walsh, 
Joanna Wlaszyn, and Yue Zhuang. 
 
Eran Ben-Joseph, 2012. Rethinking a Lot: 
The Design and Culture of Parking. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
This city planner asks if parking lots can be aesthetically 
pleasing and environmentally and architecturally responsible. 
He provides ―a visual history of this often ignored urban 
space, introducing some of the many alternative and non-
parking purposes that parking lots have served—from RV 
campgrounds to stages for ―Shakespeare in the Parking Lot.‖ 
He argues that, with purposeful design, ―parking lots could be 
significant public places, contributing as much to their com-
munities as great boulevards, parks, or plazas.‖ The result: 
―New uses for urban spaces traditionally considered banal and 
devoid of culture.‖ 
 
Hernan Casakin & Fátima Bernardo, eds., 
2012. The Role of Place Identity in the Per-
ception, Understanding, and Design of Built 
Environments. Bussum, The Netherlands: 
Betham Publishers [e-book format]. 
 
Edited by environmental psychologists, this volume‘s 15 
chapters emphasize ―the role played by place identity with 
regard to architecture and the city.‖ Contributions include: 
―Place Identity and Religion‖ (Shapa Mazumdar & Sanjoy 
Mazumdar); ―Place Identity Principles and Cultural Metaphors 
in a Mexican Environment‖ (Hernan Casakin & Esi Abbam 
Elliot); ―Place and the Politics of Local Identity: Belonging 
and Immigrant Settlement in American Suburbia‖ (Debra Lat-
tanzi Shutika); ―Identity and Identification: The Role of Archi-
tectural Identity in a Globalised World‖ (Robert Adam); 
―Wither Genius Loci? The City, Urban Fabric and Identity in 
Perth, Western Australia‖ (Felicity Morel-Edniebrown); and 
―Place, Place Identity, and Phenomenology‖ (David Seamon). 
 
Anat Geva, 2012. Frank Lloyd Wright’s Sa-
cred Architecture: Faith, Form, and Building 
Technology. NY: Routledge. 
 
This architect examines Frank Lloyd Wright‘s religious archi-
tecture, of which there are more than 30 projects, ten of them 
built. The author interprets these works around the three major 
themes of nature, democracy and freedom, and holistic design. 
 
Two Book Reviews 
 
Jorge Otero-Pailos, 2010. Architecture’s Historical Turn: Phenomenology and the 
Rise of the Postmodern. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
 
Whither “Architectural Phenomenology”? 
David Seamon 
 
his architectural theorist‘s historiography of 
theory in American departments of Archi-
tecture is a useful contribution and provoca-
tive challenge to phenomenological re-
search dealing with architectural and environmental 
concerns. Otero-Pailos delineates the academic rise 
and fall of what he calls ―architectural phenomenolo-
gy‖—a field of research and practice perhaps best 
likened to current phenomenological writings on en-
vironmental and architectural embodiment, particu-
larly its perceptual, sensuous, and motility dimen-
sions (for example, work of architects Juhani Pallas-
maa, Rachel McCann, and Thomas Thiis-Evensen, 
none of whom are discussed in Otero-Pailos‘ book). 
Nowhere in Architecture’s Historical Turn does 
Otero-Pailos explicitly define ―architectural phenom-
T 
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enology‖ (henceforth AP), though he associates it 
with such descriptions as: 
 
 ―authentic, original human experiences‖ (p. xi); 
 ―the primacy of lived experience‖ (xii); 
 ―an experiential source of intellectuality‖ (xiii); 
 ―sensory experience as an essentialist, ahistorical, antitheo-
retical, irrational, and subjective flight from all scholarly 
conventions‖ (xiv); 
 ―experiencing… primordial form‖ (xiv); 
 ―recognizable patterns of experiencing buildings‖ (xiv); 
 ―the body and flesh as sites of borderline spiritualist and 
mystic experiences‖ (xviii); 
 ―a certain kind of experience, at once of the moment and 
timeless‖ (xxiii); 
 ―an elemental language of basic bodily experiences‖ 
(xxxii); 
 ―the deeper prelinguistic experiential language that… was 
the organizational principle of every building ever built‖ 
(xxxiii); 
 ―a timeless sensual ‗language‘ of immediate experiences 
that architects could intuit across the spans of time‖ (11); 
 ―the direct experience of buildings‖ (11); 
 ―direct experience as the historic content of buildings‖ (12); 
 ―a bodily communion with architecture‖ (26). 
 
Ostero-Pailos argues that AP played a major role 
in establishing American Architecture departments as 
viable university units of scholarly research (in addi-
tion to their more conventional role as centers for 
professional architectural training). ―[T]here is no 
mother tongue to architectural communication,‖ he 
writes. ―Rather interpretations [in this case, AP] 
function as seizures of power, as ways to gain cultur-
al capital and to take up a position within politically 
charged disciplinary multiplicities‖ (7). 
To demonstrate the ―seizure of academic power‖ 
that AP provided American Architecture depart-
ments, Otero-Pailos devotes a chapter each to the ac-
ademic careers of four ―architect-scholars‖ (10): 
French-born architect Jean Labutut (1899–1986), 
who founded the first American Architecture doctoral 
program at Princeton in 1949; American architect 
Charles Moore (1925–1993), who completed in 
1957 one of Princeton‘s first Architecture doctoral 
dissertations, which focused on a Gaston-Bachelard-
inspired ―Water and Architecture‖ (105); Norwegian 
architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz 
(1926–2000), well known for his several books out-
lining a phenomenology of architecture and place; 
and British-born New Left architectural theorist 
Kenneth Frampton (b. 1930), most familiar for his 
theory of ―critical regionalism‖ (and seemingly, be-
cause of his structuralist ties, at least partly out of 
place in terms of any comprehensive phenomenolog-
ical lineage). 
 In reviewing the careers of these four architect-
scholars, Otero-Pailos is not so much interested in 
clarifying or extending the reader‘s understanding of 
AP. Rather, drawing on the structuralist theory of 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Otero-Pailos ar-
gues that these four men provided a platform, either 
directly or indirectly, whereby AP undermined the 
academic power of art historians, who until the 
1950s, were the only academics with sufficient 
scholarly weight and prestige to advance any ―theory 
of architecture.‖ Otero-Pailos seeks to demonstrate 
that his four architect-scholars, drawing on philo-
sophical phenomenology loosely (and sometimes in-
correctly, according to Otero-Pailos), wrestled from 
the art historians the academic right to produce and 
sanction architectural theory. This move, according 
to Otero-Pailos, did much intentionally and uninten-
tionally to facilitate both postmodernist design and 
also the poststructuralism and social-constructivism 
that dominate architectural theory today—much of it, 
ironically, hostile to AP [1]. 
 
Dead or Alive? 
Otero-Pailos is ambivalent about the current state of 
AP. Twice, in different ways, he claims its demise. In 
his chapter on Norberg-Schulz, he marks its death via 
the 1987 publication of Chilean historian Victor Fari-
as‘s Heidegger and Nazism, which concluded that 
Heideggerian philosophy was inherently fascistic and 
―dealt a final blow to architectural phenomenology, 
which was already under the pressure of new post-
structuralist approaches to the questions of history 
and theory‖ (23). Later in the book, Otero-Pailos 
points to a different moment of AP demise: the 1988 
issue of the Pratt Journal of Architecture, which con-
tained articles by both the AP ―old guard‖ (including 
Dalibor Vesely, Paul Schneider, and John Lobell) as 
well as younger anti-phenomenological theorists like 
John Knesl, Hilde Heynen, and Mark Wigley, who 
―began instituting a ‗nonfoundational‘ approach to 
phenomenology, which prepared the ground for the 
introduction of poststructuralist theory‖ (259) [2]. 
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If through these two moments of attack, Otero-
Pailos seems to conclude that AP is dead, at other 
points in the book he recognizes that it is still alive 
but offers unclear reasons for mostly disregarding 
this more recent work. For example, he explains the 
absence in his text of architect and phenomenology 
proponent Steven Holl because he and unnamed re-
lated ―others‖ are ―less concerned with questions of 
historiography‖ (20), though what this explanation 
for omission means, Otero-Pailos doesn‘t elaborate. 
And in his epilogue, he grudgingly recognizes that 
recent architect-scholars like Alberto Pérez-Gómez, 
David Leatherbarrow, and Helen Powell have pro-
duced phenomenological work that helps build ―a 
mantle of resistance to the poststructuralist revision 
of architectural phenomenology‖ (259). 
 In other words, Otero-Pailos largely ignores the 
well-documented production of current phenomeno-
logical thinking and research in architecture and al-
lied disciplines. Instead, because of his Bourdieuian 
historiographical framework, he is much more intent 
on highlighting the broader professional and societal 
failures and misfires of AP, which, if we accept 
Otero-Pailos‘ claim, are benumbing in their range of 
unintended consequences, including a return to a neo-
modernism that is the puppet of global capitalism: 
 
[The] indecisiveness and inability [of architectural phenomenol-
ogists] to completely break with modernism produced unintend-
ed results after deconstruction, when we witness a neo-
modernist return to formalism and a turn away from the post-
modernist concepts of history and theory. In the new neomod-
ernist context, Frampton‘s figure of the master-mason became 
the model for architects interested in controlling construction 
costs through rapid prototyping and in eliminating the skilled 
craftsmen that Frampton cared so much about. Norberg-
Schulz‘s ―spirit of place‖ was less a path to preserving ―rooted 
building‖ than an expeditious aesthetic enabling multinational 
corporate architecture firms to compete with local architects. 
Moore‘s exaltation of the body as the path to intense communal 
experience eased the transition to corporate architecture, which 
catered to the culture of private exuberance and turned a blind 
eye to public squalor in places like Dubai and Shanghai. Rooted 
in a reaction to the collusion of secularism, capitalism, and aes-
thetic austerity, architectural phenomenology nevertheless 
adapted premodern symbols to modern ends, eased the adjust-
ment to new modes of production, and aided the transformation 
of modern architectural practice into the bureaucratic admin-
istration of the built environment (23–24). 
 
To hold AP responsible for these many aesthetic 
and ideological blunders and misdirections is ques-
tionable and in many ways unreasonable. In this 
sense, Otero-Pailos‘ Bourdieuian historiography has 
much less to do with ―an unprejudiced account of 
[AP’s] history‖ (xv) and much more to do with an 
arbitrary, selective effort to brand AP as the domi-
nant but flawed conceptual vehicle via which Ameri-
can architectural programs gained academic and in-
tellectual currency to the point where, in some pro-
grams, theory and ideology have come to impede, 
and even cripple, design and practice.  
 
A Valuable Addition 
In spite of an incomplete historiography, Otero-
Pailos‘ book is a valuable addition to the phenomeno-
logical literature on environmental and architectural 
matters because it reviews some early innovative ef-
forts to generate theories and designs that arose from 
and sought to enhance human experience. The archi-
tectural and environmental works created by Labutut 
to evoke a sense of participatory exhilaration and ar-
chitectural sacredness through visual, acoustic, and 
tactile encounter are fascinating, particularly as illus-
trated in the photographs that Otero-Pailos includes. 
These works—for example, Labutut‘s 1,400-nozzle 
fountain, ―Lagoon of Nations,‖ designed to create a 
nightly spectacle for the 1939 New York World‘s 
Fair—are an important but largely unknown example 
of early design efforts seeking to widen and deepen 
environmental experience [see sketches, p. 1].  
Similarly, Charles Moore‘s work on Gaston 
Bachelard and the experiential qualities of water 
could be put to much more detailed phenomenologi-
cal explication and extension as could Norberg-
Schulz‘s innovative efforts to use complementary 
texts—writing, photographs, and drawings—to more 
thoroughly evoke and understand genius loci and en-
vironmental ambience (an approach that Otero-Pailos 
attacks as an ―instrumental misuse of Heidegger‖ 
[147] and a ―hypostatization of the invisible as the 
origin of history‖ [161]). Otero-Pailos occasionally 
points toward the creative, expansive possibilities of 
these architect-scholars but, because of his focus on 
institutional power structure, this work does not re-
ceive the empathetic attention a more purely-inspired 
phenomenological interpretation would provide. 
 As someone who lived through the latter phase 
of the first wave of phenomenology‘s infusion in the 
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architectural and environmental disciplines in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, I would argue that AP as 
Otero-Pailos presents it was actually part of a much 
broader academic interest in phenomenology that 
arose from the overwhelmingly palpable ethos of the 
1960s that impacted almost everyone in the Western 
world in one way or another, both professionally and 
personally. Not only architects but also many geog-
raphers, psychologists, and other social scientists 
called into question the positivist, reductive mindset 
that at that time dominated the academy. Otero-Pailos 
says nothing about the powerful ―environment-
behavior‖ movement that penetrated environmental 
and design programs beginning in the early 1960s, 
driven by the compelling work of Jane Jacobs, Ed-
ward Hall, Robert Sommer, Kevin Lynch, Oscar 
Newman, and Christopher Alexander, to name a few. 
Some of this research remained objectivist and 
limited to the cognitive dimensions of architectural 
and environmental behavior, but other scholars, espe-
cially geographers like Edward Relph, Yi-Fu Tuan, 
and Anne Buttimer, rejected positivist science and 
looked toward Continental traditions, including phe-
nomenology. One important model was the empirical 
phenomenological research conducted by psycholo-
gists at Pittsburgh‘s Duquesne University and pro-
moted in four edited collections, Duquesne Studies in 
Phenomenological Psychology, published by Du-
quesne University Press between 1971 and 1983. I 
still remember vividly the pleasure and relief I felt as 
a doctoral student when I discovered the series‘ first 
volume because it provided a range of methodologi-
cal possibilities for doing real-world, ―empirical‖ 
phenomenology. This work demonstrated convinc-
ingly that phenomenology need not only be done by 
philosophers, a point about which Otero-Pailos seems 
ambivalent, particularly in his harsh criticism of 
Norberg-Schulz‘s interpretation of Heidegger. 
Another important event relating to AP was the 
founding in 1968 of the Environmental Design Re-
search Association (EDRA), which provided a re-
markable interdisciplinary exchange, with architects, 
planners, and social scientists joining together in 
common ground to better understand peoples‘ lived 
relationship with buildings and places. The behavior-
al and experiential support and emphases of this 
group eventually provided one institutional founda-
tion for more explicit phenomenological work deal-
ing with environmental and architectural concerns, 
including the 1990 founding of EAP, which was orig-
inally provided an organizational base by EDRA. 
  
The Current Situation 
I don‘t disagree with Otero-Pailos‘ conclusion that a 
first phase of AP had wound down by the late 1980s 
as deconstructivist, poststructural, feminist, and criti-
cal perspectives came to dominate theory, not only in 
architecture but in philosophy, the social sciences, 
and planning as well. But beneath the conceptual 
hubbub of these relativist, power-grounded theories, 
the much quieter voice of phenomenological research 
continued to speak, especially through the writings of 
phenomenological philosophers like Edward Casey, 
Bruce Janz, Jeff Malpas, Robert Mugerauer, and In-
grid Leman Stefanovic, who all wrote book-length 
studies of the phenomena of place, dwelling, and en-
vironmental embodiment and materiality. 
Additional phenomenological force propelling 
these topics was provided by architectural theorists 
Juhani Pallasmaa and Thomas Thiis-Evensen; reli-
gious scholars Ronald Engel and Belden Lane; and 
anthropologists Tim Ingold and Christopher Tilley. 
Geographer Edward Relph‘s seminal 1976 Place and 
Placelessness, the first phenomenology of place, was 
reprinted, with a new introduction, in 2008; and phi-
losopher Edward Casey‘s influential Getting Back 
into Place was reprinted in an expanded version in 
2009. Philosopher Otto Bollnow‘s classic Human 
Space finally appeared in English translation in 2011. 
The first international ―Architecture and Phenome-
nology‖ conference was held in Haifa, Israel, in 
2007; and a second conference was held in Kyoto, 
Japan, in 2009. All these accomplishments indicate 
that ―architectural phenomenology‖ is alive and well. 
For the most recent efforts in phenomenological 
research, one useful impact of the much more domi-
nant critical-theory perspectives has been their moti-
vating phenomenologists to widen their recognition 
of human experience. For example, the traditional 
phenomenological emphases on rootedness, center, 
home, dwelling, emplacement, stasis, and real places 
(criticized by poststructuralists, as Otero-Pailos 
points out [263, n. 12]), are being complemented with 
work on peripheries, mobility, not-at-homeness, dis-
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placement, placelessness, environmental dynamism, 
virtual places, and so forth. In arguing against the so-
cial-constructivist criticism that phenomenological 
research is essentialist, phenomenologists have 
worked to probe specific human situations and life-
worlds, demonstrating the approach can deal as well 
with human difference, hybridity, and alterity as it 
can with human commonalities and lived foundation-
al qualities. As witnessed by EAP entries, there is a 
continuing interest in phenomenological method and 
discoveries, especially among younger scholars who 
have come to realize the muddled emptiness of much 
of the social-constructivist and critical research. 
Otero-Pailos provides some superb new material 
on early practitioners of ―architectural phenomenolo-
gy.‖ One must emphasize, however, that the histori-
ography of AP delineated in his book is a partial 
point of view. Environmental and architectural phe-
nomenology remains robust. Its most important con-
tributions to architectural theory and practice may yet 
lie in the future. 
 
Notes 
1. One assumes that Otero-Pailos‘ book arises from his 
2001 MIT Architecture dissertation, ―Theorizing the Anti-
Avant-Garde: Invocations of Phenomenology in Architectural 
Discourse, 1945–1989.‖ One advisor for this thesis was MIT 
architectural theorist Mark Jarzombek, whose 2001 The Psy-
chologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, and History (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press) is highly critical of how artists and archi-
tects drew on phenomenological and hermeneutic ideas. He 
writes: ―Works by Heidegger and Gadamer were especially val-
ued, especially once it was known that Gadamer claimed that we 
can experience every work of art ‗immediately, without further 
mediation‘. Once again, among artists and architects, the issue 
was not so much what the European philosophers were really 
trying to convey… but how to mine their work for quotes. This 
is not to critique the aestheticness of the resultant theorizations 
for being superficial (that presupposes a more correct way of 
understanding, which I also reject) but rather to outline the rea-
sons for its power…. Unfortunately, ‗phenomenology‘ and ‗ex-
istentialism‘ became little more than buzz words hiding perfect-
ly conventional inspirationalist attitudes toward the aesthetic‖ 
(202). One finds the seeds of Otero-Pailos‘ historiographic ap-
proach in Jarzombek‘s definition of historiography as ―the site 
of an intellectual functionalism that banishes unwanted realities 
in the name of a clarified field of operation‖ (9). 
2. In our first issue of EAP, we included a brief review of 
this 1988 issue, recognizing that its poststructural essays were a 
serious challenge to conventional phenomenological work (vol. 
1 [1990], issue 1, pp. 6–8). 
 
Seamon is the Editor of Environmental and Architec-
tural Phenomenology. 
 
The State of Architectural Phenomenology 
Benoît Jacquet  
 
efore discussing Jorge Otero-Pailos‘ Archi-
tecture’s Historical Turn: Phenomenology 
and the Rise of the Postmodern, I want to 
explain briefly how I‘ve come to write this 
review. After the first international conference, ―Ar-
chitecture and Phenomenology,‖ held in 2007 at the 
Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, a second con-
ference was organized in 2009 in Kyoto, Japan. For 
that second conference, some 120 scholars submitted 
papers. I was asked, as head of the Kyoto branch of 
the Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient (French 
School of Asian Studies, or EFEO), to provide logis-
tical support for the conference. After the event, 
EFEO Kyoto produced an electronic version of the 
proceedings (some 2000 pages!) that garnered much 
attention, and we later decided to produce an edited 
volume including 21 papers. This volume is entitled 
From the Things Themselves: Architecture and Phe-
nomenology (Kyoto University Press/EFEO, 2012) 
[see ―citations received,‖ p. 3]. 
The 2007 and 2009 ―Architecture and Phenome-
nology‖ conferences were organized before the pub-
lication of Otero-Pailos‘ Architecture’s Historical 
Turn. In fact, we did not know of its publication 
when we were preparing From the Things Them-
selves. The success of the two conferences and the 
appearance of Otero-Pailos‘ book indicate that, for 
architects (and for many artists too), phenomenology 
is a major theoretical influence and that so-called 
―architectural phenomenology‖ has a certain histori-
cal momentum. 
Even if, however, phenomenology is currently 
one of the leading conceptual trends in the field, it is 
obviously not the only available theory. It has never 
B 
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been nor will it ever be the only theoretical tool for 
architects. In both the first and last chapters of his 
book, Otero-Pailos suggests that phenomenology is 
no longer the favored philosophy among architects 
and has been usurped by more current ways of think-
ing. Nonetheless, in the early part of this decade, the 
term ―phenomenology‖ still appears regularly in ar-
chitectural book titles, albeit with a more ―classical‖ 
connotation. Indeed, the very last words of Architec-
ture’s Historical Turn are ―we are not entirely free 
from its grasp.‖ 
Phenomenology represents so many things for 
architects today that it is difficult to define exactly 
the meaning of ―architectural phenomenology,‖ or 
even, ―phenomenology‖ itself.  As pointed out at the 
Kyoto conference by philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, 
architectural historians have produced most of the 
discourse on ―architecture and phenomenology,‖ 
providing many illuminating insights. But one may 
also suggest that this architectural ―filter‖ has result-
ed in a certain distance from the original purpose of 
phenomenology. 
Jorge Otero-Pailos‘ book provides some explana-
tion of this particular evolution of phenomenology in 
architecture. I myself am an architectural historian 
but, in editing the conference papers, I felt it im-
portant to collaborate with a trained philosopher, Vin-
cent Giraud, who was a student of Jean-Luc Marion 
at the Sorbonne, to return to the philosophical roots 
of phenomenology. The purpose and contents of our 
jointly edited From the Things Themselves have little 
in common with Otero-Pailos‘ argument in his book, 
but EAP Editor David Seamon invited me to do a re-
view, partly because I have not been educated in the 
United States and perhaps have a certain distance 
from the American scene as described in Architec-
ture’s Historical Turn.  
 
“Architect-Scholars” 
I would say that Otero-Pailos‘ main thrust is demon-
strating that phenomenology is an adequate medium 
for bringing theoretical support to the teaching of ar-
chitectural essence, for both designers and theorists, 
including historians. Otero-Pailos demonstrates 
amazingly well how architects have adopted phe-
nomenological approaches to establish a certain type 
of scholarship that tackles directly more conventional 
and academic teachings, blazing a new path for the 
architectural historian. We can thus imagine how Jean 
Labatut, Charles Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz, 
but also Kenneth Frampton, have assimilated this 
philosophical background to create a new profession, 
that of ―architect scholar.‖ 
Otero-Pailos admirably renders how phenomeno-
logical language fits well with the architect‘s mind, 
helping to bridge dualities that have plagued both 
philosophy and the sciences since the classical peri-
od—for example, the gap between the sensible and 
the intellectual. In its original form, phenomenology 
discovered that the senses can precede reason, that 
sensitivity can be applied to sensibility, that illusion 
can also be a form of truth, and that practical experi-
ence can be a source of theoretical knowledge. Phe-
nomenology offers a way to reconnect design to tex-
tual analysis and things to words. 
In my opinion, phenomenology and, in particu-
lar, the phenomenological sources that have been 
popular among architects, are far from representing a 
non-intellectual, or even an anti-intellectual stand-
point. Rejecting the intellect per se was never Hus-
serl‘s intention. Similarly, Heidegger and Bachelard‘s 
hermeneutical approaches, excavating the essence of 
literature and poetry, are far from representing an an-
ti-intellectual attitude. One of the reasons phenome-
nology is most attractive to architects is its power to 
―gather‖—and even give ―intellectual‖ legitimacy 
to—many aspects related to architecture and spatiali-
ty that are not apprehended by other philosophical or 
professional perspectives. In this sense, phenomenol-
ogy relates well to architects‘ ―interdisciplinary‖ 
minds and their desire to bring together sensitivity 
and sensibility to the applied, real-world processes of 
design and construction. 
 
Interdisciplinarity 
David Seamon‘s review of Architecture’s Historical 
Turn [see pp. 3–7] highlights the fact that, at some 
points in his discussion, Otero-Pailos criticizes archi-
tectural phenomenology and its possible decline, or 
―death.‖ This interpretation generates a certain 
amount of ambivalence that can lead to extreme, en-
trenched views, something I hope to avoid here. I can 
readily guess that, possibly for political reasons, 
some people may be more inclined to pronounce the 
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―death of phenomenology,‖ leaving the path open for 
other forms of thinking. It is not my intention here, 
however, to outline who may be in a position to take 
advantage of phenomenology‘s potential demise (―à 
qui profite le crime?‖). Instead, I would rather claim 
that a phenomenological approach is compatible with 
many other theoretical, intellectual, historical, and 
social traditions. The writings of Heidegger, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard, Derrida, and Ricoeur have 
inspired architectural students for more than half a 
century, but phenomenology has never been the only 
way of thinking used by architects. 
For instance, Nietzsche, the ―artist philosopher,‖ 
has been popular among architects as have philoso-
phies allowing architects to imagine conceptual in-
terpretations—for example, Deleuze and Guattari‘s 
―thousand plateaux,‖ ―desiring machines,‖ ―rhi-
zomes,‖ and ―fold‖; Foucault‘s ―heterotopia‖; 
Barthes‘ ―mythology‖; and so forth. Architects do not 
necessarily need to adhere to only one form of think-
ing and to only one school of philosophy. On the con-
trary, the process of creation requires a form of intel-
lectual ―pottering‖—in reference to Levi-Strauss‘ no-
tion of bricolage. Architectural concepts arise 
through a complex process of thinking and intuition, 
and architects can draw on whatever is available, 
within hand-reach or mind-reach, to complete their 
ideas and visions. 
For example, in seminars I attended in the late 
1990s at Paris‘ EHESS (École des hautes études en 
sciences sociales), students were queuing to see Der-
rida, and Koolhaas was lecturing for free in front of 
an audience of 50. In a logical, coherent way that was 
far from surrealistic, philosopher and Orientalist Au-
gustin Berque was dealing, in two hour segments, 
with the thought of Plato, Leroi-Gourhan, Bergson, 
Heidegger, Henri Lefebvre, and Japanese philoso-
phers Nishida and Watsuji. 
This environment was not just limited to one in-
stitute. In French schools of Architecture, the depart-
ments of History are not separate from those of Ar-
chitectural Theory. Rather, they compose one sole 
academic section of History and Architectural Theo-
ry. Historians work closely with sociologists, anthro-
pologists, geographers, and linguists. For instance, I 
remember that Jean-Louis Cohen would often refer to 
various psychoanalytic concepts. He always encour-
aged students (at least myself) to explore and extend 
philosophical interpretations. Jean-Louis also insisted 
on the necessary use of images and photographs for 
strengthening architectural discourse. 
 
Back to Experiencing Things 
Rather than focus on the possible decline of phenom-
enology among young architects, it may well be that 
there is a larger issue involved—the seeming decline 
of ―theory‖ within current architectural education. As 
argued by Mark Jarzombek in ―The State of ‗Theo-
ry‘‖ (in L. King, ed., Architecture and Theory: Pro-
duction and Reflection, Junius Verlag, 2009), ―Archi-
tecture‘s messy disciplinarity, which was the result of 
the theory and history movements, is being cleaned 
up, sanitized, and simplified.‖ The main issue is not 
related to the fluctuation of ideologies—post-
structuralism, feminism, neo-Marxism, post-
colonialism—but due to the fact that, sometimes, 
―thinking‖ loses some fundamental motivations. As 
theorist Sanford Kwinter suggested in the 1990s, 
technical modernity has created an environment that 
is ―far from equilibrium‖ because, in many respects, 
virtual worlds can become more exciting than actual 
lifeworlds. The end of the city (and of architecture) 
arrives when social networking, shopping, and play-
ing in front of a computer screen become more inter-
esting than going outside into the ―real‖ world. 
 In this regard, let me tentatively postulate some 
possible solutions or avenues of thought. Perhaps we 
ought to sometimes go back to the things that we 
used to do, even be ―old-school‖: Re-read books; re-
practice handwriting and hand drawing; even day-
dream and re-experience ―boredom‖ as Bachelard 
recommends in his Poetics of Space. More concrete-
ly, Otero-Pailos, who is also well known for his work 
as an artist, describes what postwar architect-
historians brought to the classroom and even outside 
the classroom. We learn that Jean Labatut painted on 
his students‘ faces to teach them the experience of 
camouflage (photograph, p. 27) and that Charles 
Moore encouraged students to paint on buildings so 
that architectural design was experienced ―as some-
thing immediate by removing the intermediary step 
of technical drawing‖ (p. 127). 
Immediate ―experience,‖ ―embodiment,‖ and 
―tactility‖ can also be a form of ―architectural re-
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sistance‖ to technical modernity—a social and politi-
cal engagement proving, as Kenneth Frampton‘s re-
search shows, that architectural phenomenology does 
not only deal with an elitist aesthetics.  
 
Intellectual History’s Past & Future 
In his book, Otero-Pailos adopts a particular method-
ology that avoids mere historical periodicity, insisting 
that ―the individual, and indeed the social, experienc-
es of time‖ (p. 4) are redefining the term ―contempo-
rary,‖ which ―[r]ather than a stable period of time …, 
is an unstable category whose contents are constantly 
changing in relation to the tensions and power rela-
tions between different generation of architects‖ (p. 
6). Adopting what Seamon, in his review, labels as a 
―Bourdieuian historiography,‖ Architecture’s Histori-
cal Turn is also a book of social and intellectual his-
tory, and I can see some similarities in its sociological 
approach with, for instance, François Cusset‘s French 
Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. 
Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States 
(University of Minnesota Press, 2007). 
Architecture’s Historical Turn shows the influ-
ence of European scholars (of continental philoso-
phy) on American schools of Architecture. This com-
parison is obviously radical, and as such, Otero-
Pailos‘ book is much more focused than French The-
ory. Otero-Pailos examines the fundamental thinking 
and intellectual strategies of four generations of ar-
chitect-scholars who have invented a genuine form of 
teaching architecture. He explains how practicing ar-
chitects have used phenomenology (and philosophy 
in general) for finding an alternative to pure historical 
studies, thus becoming leading architectural theorists. 
Compared to the French academic system, we 
can see that American graduate schools of Architec-
ture have been very efficient in establishing doctoral 
programs after World War II. In contrast, French 
schools of Architecture did not have doctoral pro-
grams before the late 1990s. Even now, most French 
architects get their doctorates outside graduate 
schools of Architecture—from faculties of Letters, 
departments of History, Geography, Urban Planning, 
Liberal Arts, Sociology, Anthropology, and so forth. 
Returning to the present and asking the future 
state of phenomenology for architects, I cannot help 
thinking that the work of Norberg-Schulz has influ-
enced may Architecture students, especially in the 
1980s. For many, books like Genius Loci encapsulate 
the core of ―architectural phenomenology.‖ I can 
guess that this is also Otero-Pailos point of view, 
since he states in the opening sentence of his book: 
―When I entered Cornell University‘s undergraduate 
architectural program in the 1980s, an older student 
handed my classmates and me a copy of Christian 
Norberg-Schulz‘s Genius Loci and told us to read it if 
we wanted to get through school.‖ 
When I studied architecture in France in the 
1990s, the first book I was advised to read was Le 
Corbusier‘s Towards an Architecture; the first time I 
heard of Norberg-Schulz, some years later, his dis-
course was then already considered to be ―out of 
fashion,‖ although Sigfried Giedion‘s Space, Time 
and Architecture was still a ―must read.‖ In most 
French Architecture schools, modernists had more 
power than post-modernists, and architectural theory 
could easily refer to Heideggerian phenomenology 
without ever referring to Norberg-Schulz‘s writings. 
The renewal of ―architectural phenomenolo-
gy‖—in particular, the reinterpretation of Merleau-
Ponty by architects like Juhanni Pallasmaa and Ste-
ven Holl—indicates the polyvalence of phenomenol-
ogy for architects. Architects also refer to Jean-Luc 
Marion‘s notion of ―givenness,‖ to Anthony Stein-
bock‘s generative phenomenology, to David Leather-
barrow‘s architectural and phenomenal ―descrip-
tions,‖ to David Seamon‘s environmental phenome-
nology, to Karsten Harries‘ environmental insights on 
ethics, and to thinkers such as Dalibor Vesely, Alberto 
Pérez-Gómez, Rachel McCann, Adam Sharr—just to 
mention a few of many architect-scholars who draw 
on phenomenological approaches. 
Otero-Pailos‘ book is a milestone for the histori-
ography of architectural phenomenology and reveals 
what this discipline has accomplished and generated. 
Moreover, the next generation has already emerged, 
and is spreading over the world like a rhizome. 
 
Jacquet is a French architectural historian and Asso-
ciate Professor of Japanese architecture at the Ecole 
Française d‘Extrême-Orient in Paris. He is co-editor 
of From the Things Themselves: Architecture and 
Phenomenology, a collection of articles based on pa-
pers presented at the 2
nd
 conference on ―Architecture 
and Phenomenology‖ (see ―citations received,‖ p. 2). 
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henomenologist Herbert Spiegelberg (1982) 
argued that there is neither a system or 
school called ―phenomenology‖ nor is there 
a definitive body of work that gives an exact 
answer to the question, ―What is phenomenology?‖ 
He suggested that any claim of a unified phenomeno-
logical philosophy is an illusion: ―Phenomenologists 
are much too individualistic in their habits to form an 
organized ‗school‘‖ (p. xxvii). 
This individuality is so strong, he claimed, that 
―There are as many phenomenologists as there are 
phenomenologies.‖ He suggested that ―It is certainly 
true that, on closer inspection, the varieties exceed 
the common features‖ (ibid.). He concluded that: 
 
1. Phenomenology is a dynamic philosophy that ad-
vances in relation to intrinsic principles as well as 
to the ―things‖ it studies—in other words, in rela-
tion to the typical  territory it encounters; 
2. Like a stream, phenomenology incorporates paral-
lel currents, all related but by no means homoge-
neous or moving at the same speed; 
3. These phenomenological currents have a common 
point of departure but need not move toward the 
same destination; rather, many of these currents 
branch out in different directions that, collective-
ly, can be considered as a ―phenomenological 
movement‖ (ibid., pp. 1-2). 
 
The question I ask here is whether Spiegelberg‘s 
formulation of a ―movement‖ is appropriate for phe-
nomenological work in architecture. Are architectural 
phenomenologists as various as philosophical phe-
nomenologists? Can we call the phenomenological 
approach to architecture a ―movement‖ in the same 
way that we speak of modern architecture as a ―mod-
ernist movement‖? Are there common ―themes‖ and 
―concerns‖ in architectural phenomenology? Or do 
differences outweigh any commonalities? 
 
Architecture & Phenomenology 
The lack of a common definition of ―phenomenolo-
gy‖ is confirmed by many phenomenologists (Mer-
leau-Ponty 1962; Moran and Mooney 2002; Moran, 
2005). Whether defined as ―a return to the things 
themselves‖ (Husserl), as ―a way of seeing‖ 
(Heidegger), or as ―the essence of perception‖ (Mer-
leau-Ponty), phenomenological approaches have been 
employed in both architectural theory and practice. 
Moran (2000, p. 4) suggests that phenomenology is 
more ―a practice rather than a system.‖ Probably be-
cause of this ―practical‖ character, phenomenology is 
of interest to architects, who sense a concrete poten-
tial in its more philosophical conceptions and themes. 
From the conceptual side, architectural theorists 
claim that phenomenology might provide a true, reli-
able way of comprehending architecture. They argue 
that phenomenology can locate the essence of things 
and phenomena and thereby might bring us nearer to 
existential being. These theorists have not only de-
veloped phenomenological approaches for interpret-
ing architecture but—whether consciously or uncon-
sciously—have sought various criteria to evaluate 
architectural works, styles, and movements. 
P
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One such phenomenological theorist is Christian 
Norberg-Schulz, who emphasizes that phenomenolo-
gy is ―a method well suited to penetrate the world of 
everyday existence‖ (Norberg-Schulz 2000, p. 15). 
Drawing especially on Martin Heidegger, Norberg-
Schulz presents phenomenology as a ―method‖ 
whereby one might understand the world, including 
the world of architecture. 
As a second representative of phenomenological 
theory in architecture, Juhani Pallasmaa presents 
phenomenology as ―‗pure looking at‘ the phenome-
non, or ‗viewing its essence‘‖ (Pallasmaa 1996, p. 
450). He claims that, by means of a ―naïve seeing,‖ 
we are able to approach the ―essence of things unbur-
dened by convention or intellectualized explanation‖ 
(Pallasmaa 2001, p. 21). In contrast, philosopher 
Karsten Harries (1991, p. 12) is uncomfortable with a 
classical understanding of phenomenology as a pure 
and firm ground. Instead, he argues that, in regard to 
dwelling and authentic thinking, phenomenological 
investigation does not necessarily assume a strict goal 
or unshakable foundation but, rather, provides a 
―way‖ or journey through ―history‖ into the future. 
Drawing on a perspective closer to Pallasmaa‘s, 
architectural theorist Eduard Führ (1998) suggests 
that phenomenology enables us to understand archi-
tecture ―as a part of our lifeworld‖ and thus brings us 
nearer to architectural phenomena. In a similar way, 
theorist David Seamon (2000) explains that the phe-
nomenological aim is locating underlying commonal-
ities that mark the essential core of the phenomenon: 
―the phenomenologist pays attention to specific in-
stances of the phenomenon with the hope that these 
instances, in time, will point toward more general 
qualities and characteristics that accurately describe 
the essential nature of the phenomenon as it has pres-
ence and meaning in the concrete lives and experi-
ences of human beings‖ (p. 159). He understands 
phenomenology as a ―kindly seeing,‖ ―seeing with 
new eyes‖ (Seamon 1993), and a ―revelatory seeing‖ 
(Seamon 2000) that allows for a ―careful description‖ 
of the phenomena (Seamon 2007). 
In a broader philosophical vein, theorist Alberto 
Pérez-Gómez argues that, in an era when architecture 
has lost its metaphysical dimension and is no longer a 
privileged form of people-world reconciliation, only 
phenomenology can rediscover the primacy of per-
ception and overcome the fundamental dilemma that 
modern philosophy inherited from Descartes: 
 
By revealing the limitations of mathematical reason, phenome-
nology has indicated that technological theory alone cannot 
come to terms with the fundamental problems of architecture. 
Contemporary architecture, disillusioned with rational utopias, 
now strives to go beyond positivistic prejudices to find a new 
metaphysical justification in the human world; its point of de-
parture is once again the sphere of perception, the ultimate 
origin of existential meaning (Pérez-Gómez 1983, p. 325). 
 
One must also emphasize that phenomenology 
has been an important groundstone for practicing ar-
chitects involved with real-world design. Studying 
architectural themes phenomenologically can enable 
architects to think deeply about these themes and 
evoke helpful images and details. One example is ar-
chitect Steven Holl (1996, p. 11), who explains: 
 
Phenomenology concerns the study of essences; architecture 
has the potential to put essences back into existence. By weav-
ing form, space, and light, architecture can elevate the experi-
ence of daily life through the various phenomena that emerge 
from specific sites, programs, and architectures. On one level, 
an idea-force drives architecture; on another, structure, material 
space, color, light, and shadow intertwine in the fabrication of 
architecture. 
 
These theoretical and applied understandings of 
phenomenology‘s value for architecture point to its 
potential for clarifying thinking about buildings and 
for facilitating design ideas. Though often quite dif-
ferent in their thematic emphases, these interpreta-
tions point toward the value of phenomenology as a 
―way,‖ a ―method,‖ or an ―approach‖ by which archi-
tectural problems can be better identified and clari-
fied. The suggestion is that phenomenology offers 
one pathway toward a deeper, more comprehensive 
understanding of architectural themes and problems. 
 
The Situation Today 
As Spiegelberg emphasized, phenomenology in phi-
losophy is not understood as a sedimented dogma or 
system. In this sense, there is no phenomenological 
―school‖ or ―circle‖ in philosophy. But what about 
phenomenology as it has been drawn upon in archi-
tecture? Should one speak of it as a school or a circle 
or a movement or something else? 
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We should not probably speak of a school of 
phenomenology in architecture. ―School‖ points to a 
group of affiliated persons who draw on a precise 
doctrine, and this is not found in architecture because 
of the variety of approaches and intentions pointed 
out above. Nor can phenomenology in architecture be 
considered a ―circle‖ in the sense that there is a less 
formal group of thinkers sharing common perspec-
tives, aims, and conclusions. It would be more accu-
rate to argue that phenomenology in architecture aris-
es more or less from common concerns of unaffiliat-
ed individuals rather than from a cooperative group 
sharing collective aims intentionally translated into 
specific actions. 
One example is ―Questions of Perception, Phe-
nomenology of Architecture,‖ a special 1994 issue of 
Architecture and Urbanism, which presents some key 
texts and projects linking phenomenology and archi-
tecture. Though this edited work points to some 
common ground, contributors Pérez-Gómez, Pallas-
maa, and Holl present their understanding of phe-
nomenology in varying ways. In this sense, the vol-
ume offers no suggestion of a phenomenological 
school or circle. 
Nor is it probably correct to associate phenome-
nology in architecture with a ―movement.‖ Spiegel-
berg argues that, in philosophy, phenomenology is a 
movement in the sense that participants share a clear 
point of departure but move at different speeds in dif-
ferent directions toward different destinations (Spie-
gelberg, 1982). As with ―school‖ and ―circle,‖ how-
ever, ―movement‖ is not really applicable in architec-
ture, partly because phenomenology has never gained 
the strong influence that one sees in philosophy. At 
this point, there are a number of independent figures 
involved with architectural phenomenology, but their 
number is not sufficient to be labeled as a movement. 
To specify this point further, we can compare 
phenomenology in architecture with the profession‘s 
―modernist‖ movement, which is now powerful 
enough to totally dominate contemporary architectur-
al discourse and practice. Competing trends like post-
modernism, high-tech, and deconstruction have not 
been able to break free from the modernist vision. In 
contrast, even though one can identify a considerable 
body of work in architectural phenomenology, none 
of these efforts have become a significant movement 
challenging the modernist legacy. 
In the end, ―discourse‖ may be the best label to 
describe the current state of phenomenology in archi-
tecture: a manner of investigation and design con-
ducted mostly by individual researchers and design-
ers who, sharing some common concerns and inten-
tions, interpret the possibilities and results of phe-
nomenological investigation in a wide array of ways, 
both conceptually and practically. In this sense, we 
can use the description ―phenomenological discourse 
in architecture,‖ which can incorporate a broad spec-
trum of theoretical and practical discussions that 
highlight such common architectural themes and 
concerns as place, space, perception, movement, na-
ture, lived body, and so forth. 
As this range of thematic possibilities suggests, 
phenomenological discourse is on-going and, in that 
sense, a process rather than a product. At some future 
time, phenomenological discourse may be able to 
transform itself into a movement or a circle or even a 
school. But that cannot occur until phenomenology in 
architecture is better known, worked with, and for-
mally organized. If this is to happen, there is required 
an on-going effort to clarify current shortcomings and 
to deepen longer-term possibilities. One need is a 
critical reading that self-critically and creatively 
evaluates the existing literature. In the last part of this 
essay, I suggest some possible directions in which 
this evaluative process might move. 
 
Major Trends 
Most broadly, phenomenological discourse in archi-
tecture is grounded in two major figures: philoso-
phers Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
[1].While Heidegger‘s ideas on dwelling, place, 
space, and being-in-the-world demonstrate the signif-
icance of ontological concerns for architecture, Mer-
leau-Ponty‘s thought on perception, body, and the 
sensible dimension of human experience provides an 
important perspective on more practical, applied ar-
chitectural issues. Christian Norberg-Schultz, for ex-
ample, confirms explicitly that ―the philosophy of 
Heidegger has been the catalyst‖ for his thinking on 
architecture (Norberg-Schulz, 2000, p. 5), particular-
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ly Heidegger‘s interpretations of being, world, truth, 
thing, fourfold, and dwelling. 
In contrast, Juhani Pallasmaa is more endebted to 
Merleau-Ponty, especially his attention to themes like 
lived body, perception, and mobility. Pallasmaa 
writes: ―Merleau-Ponty is free of the cultural con-
servatism I sense in Heidegger‘s perspective; the 
Black Forest hut of Heidegger directs architecture 
backwards, I think, whereas Merleau-Ponty points 
my thought forward‖ (Pallasmaa, 2005, p. 18). Simi-
larly, Steven Holl has been much influenced by Mer-
leau-Ponty and claims that the philosopher played a 
major role in fundamentally shifting his approach to 
architectural design (Holl, 2000). 
Other architectural phenomenologists highlight 
the same philosophical influences.  Karsten Harries 
explains that ―Heidegger has presided over much of 
my thinking, especially my thinking on architecture 
and on space‖ [2]. As a geographer and environment-
behavior researcher, David Seamon utilizes phenom-
enological ideas as a means to examine environmen-
tal behavior and experience. He explains that 
 
The phenomenological perspective I represent is … a way of 
phenomenology developed by such thinkers as Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty that moves away from 
phenomenological founder Edmund Husserl‘s focus on pure 
intellectual consciousness (Seamon 2000, p. 158).  
 
In this regard, Seamon‘s emphasis on lifeworld 
(Seamon 1979, 2000) and belonging (Seamon, 1990) 
are Heideggerean, but his focus on body-subject re-
lates to Merleau-Ponty (Seamon, 2007). In his effort 
to integrate phenomenological and architectural con-
cerns, Alberto Pérez-Gómez draws on Heidegger and 
hermeneuticist Hans-Georg Gadamer. One exception 
to a common interest in Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty is architectural historian and theorist Kenneth 
Frampton, who is deeply influenced by Heidegger, 
who he supplements with the non-phenomenological 
perspective of the Frankfurt School of philosophy. 
Frampton writes:  
 
Anyone who is familiar with my writing will at once detect the 
influence of two different lines of critical thought which in the 
main are German in origin—lines stemming from Hegel and 
Marx and culminating in Gramsci and the Frankfurt School; and 
another line, stemming from Nietzsche and Husserl, the school 
which encompasses in its range both phenomenology and exis-
tentialism and stretches to the writings of Heidegger and Han-
nah Arendt (Frampton 1989, p. 79). 
 
An Ongoing Tension 
This brief sketch of the state of phenomenology in 
architecture suggests that current efforts are best de-
scribed as an ongoing discourse relating to human 
being-in-the-world as it incorporates architectural, 
spatial, environmental, and material dimensions. Bor-
rowing from Karsten Harries, one might say that this 
discourse oscillates between Fernweh and Heim-
weh—in other words, between a future grounded in 
dreams of freedom and cosmopolitanism vs. a future 
grounded in dreams of rootedness and home: 
 
The opposition of Fernweh and Heimweh, centrifugal and cen-
tripetal longing, is constitutive of human being: in all of us a 
longing to journey, literally and metaphorically, beyond what is 
all too comfortable and familiar, challenges and is challenged by 
nostalgia, a longing to finally settle down and call some place 
home (Harries 2006, pp. 75-76). 
 
In this sense, phenomenological discourse in ar-
chitecture contributes to an ongoing tension: On one 
hand, it stands for place, dwelling, and commonality 
but, on the other hand, offers a constructive dialogue 
with space, mobility, and otherness. This tension ad-
dresses one lived dimension of human experience 
that can neither be resolved nor elided but respected 
and understood through phenomenological discourse 
in architecture: 
 
It is in this need that both architecture and the architectural met-
aphors of philosophy have their origin. The antinomy that joins 
place and space will not be resolved. Nor should it be resolved. 
And architecture, too, should affirm and seek to embody it (Har-
ries, 2006, p. 85). 
 
Notes 
1. Though not discussed here, the contributions of other philos-
ophers like Gaston Bachelard (1964) and Otto Friedrich 
Bollnow (1963/2011) are also significant.  
2. In an email to the author, September 16, 2007. 
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Eighth Letter from Far South 
Attention, Interiority, and Place 
John Cameron 
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state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522. The accompanying images by Vicki King are: ―40 spotted pardolotes,‖ p. 
16; and ―sumi-e ink drawing,‖ p. 19.  jcameronblackstone@gmail.com. © 2012 John Cameron and Vicki King. 
 
 
rom time to time at 
Blackstone, I have 
become familiar 
with different ways 
of attending to the land [1]. 
Usually this attention has 
been a background phenom-
enon, easily lost in the tu-
mult of daily activity. Spray-
ing thistles this season, how-
ever, I‘ve given much 
thought to ―paying attention‖ 
in the context of Blackstone 
placemaking and my past 
involvement with spiritual 
practices of mindfulness. 
We had a wet, windy 
spring this year. I saw this-
tles and other weeds poking 
their prickly heads through 
the grasses and knew it was time for spraying. But 
each morning I‘d watch the scudding gusts of wind 
across the d‘Entrecasteaux Channel, feel the sting of 
driven rain on my cheek, and comment ruefully to 
Vicki, ―I don‘t think it‘s a spray day today‖ [2]. 
One week in October we finally had a still, dry 
day. I shouldered my 35-pound backpack of special-
ized thistle-spray solution and started up the hill to-
ward the worst thistle infestation. I marked out my 
first traverse, pumped up the tank, and set off. Back-
pack spraying is an odd physical experience. The 
breathing filters on the facemask mean that each out-
breath is accompanied by a rubbery, flapping noise, 
making me acutely conscious 
of the sound and force of my 
breath. 
Because the mask and 
rubber gloves are designed to 
keep out chemicals, they 
cause my face and hands to 
perspire. To keep the spray 
from penetrating my walking 
boots and trousers, I wear 
knee-high Wellington boots, 
which make hillside move-
ment difficult. My physio-
therapist advised that I wear 
knee braces, since there is no 
ankle or knee support in 
―wellies.‖ These knee braces 
impede my ability to bend or 
flex my legs, and the heavy 
backpack pulls on my shoul-
ders and its liquid contents slosh about as I turn or 
bend. I also wear tight back and wrist braces to sup-
port other weak parts of my 60-year-old body. The 
combined effect creates a strange, constrained world 
in which I am self-conscious of my breathing and my 
sweating skin bound up in Velcro and rubber. 
 
 am making progress in discouraging thistles and 
weeds and encouraging native grasses and trees, 
but the consequence is that hand spraying has be-
come trickier. No longer are there expanses of the 
same thistle and little else. Now there are five species 
of thistle and four common weeds dotted throughout 









habitat. The slender thistle (Carduus pycnocephalus) 
tends to merge with the tall grass until I can spot the 
pale purple flowering head, while capeweed (Arcto-
theca calendula) creeps along the ground between 
grass stalks. If I keep my eye too much at ground 
level, however, I can miss the rosettes of Scotch this-
tle (Onopordum acanthium), which are most visible 
at mid-height. 
When I spray, I systematically cover an area in 
three-meter-wide traverses, which is the width of 
ground that the tip of the spray gun covers in a sweep 
from left to right. Keeping track of where I have just 
sprayed is essential. Unfortunately, the only environ-
mentally-friendly, water-soluble dye is deep blue, not 
easily recognizable against dark green weeds and 
thistles. As I carefully look for the blue, I must also 
remember the tree, rock, or stake that marks the end 
of the traverse. 
The year before, my left shoulder had become so 
painful from spraying that I consulted a physiothera-
pist, who noted I was hunching my shoulders forward 
as if I were pushing myself to get across the slope 
faster. ―Drop your shoulders back, keep your body 
upright, stay relaxed and in touch with your mental 
posture and attitude,‖ she advised. Easier said than 
done! I didn‘t have the luxury of practicing body-
mind scanning—thistles were in blossom everywhere 
and required elimination before they set seed. 
I was tottering across the slope equally weighed 
down by backpack and mental injunctions (―Remem-
ber the tops of the grasses,‖ ―Don‘t forget the periph-
eral vision,‖ ―What are your shoulders doing?‖), 
oblivious to the fact that it was a superb day to be out 
in the fields. The pressure of imminently seeding 
thistles couldn‘t become another burden to carry but 
had to remain part of my awareness. I needed to keep 
attention between thistles, markers, back and shoul-
ders, and internal state of mind. 
In mid-traverse, I stopped for breath. Standing in 
waist-high grass and weeds, I realized I was near a 
knoll where a few days before I had paused in the 
wind. Encumbered in protective gear and support 
braces, my head full of all the things I needed to keep 
track of, I remembered that feeling of expansiveness 
with a laugh, and suddenly it all seemed very famil-
iar. My inability to keep relaxed attention on my 
mind, body, and surroundings reminded me of how at 
spiritual retreats I seemed to sometimes master the 
multi-focused attention and mindfulness practices I 
was taught but could never maintain them in daily 
life once I was out of the environment in which they 
were introduced [3]. 
 
 was an active member of spiritual groups of var-
ious persuasions for decades. I‘ve received ad-
vanced teachings on training the mind and Bud-
dhist philosophy from Tibetan lamas, spent hundreds 
of hours in meditation learning mindfulness and visu-
alization techniques. Before that for many years, I 
was a member of a Gurdjieff group. In the inspira-
tional environment of a long Buddhist retreat or in 
the highly-charged daily meetings of a small Fourth 
Way group, I had occasional moments of mental clar-
ity, but they seldom lasted long. 
In all these traditions, working with attention was 
acentral to training the mind. To begin we focused on 
an object of attention—the movement of breath or a 
mandala—and kept returning to the object whenever 
thoughts strayed. Then we moved to gently taking 
one‘s attention off the particular object and onto the 
quality of awareness itself. In theory, this effort led to 
developing an all-encompassing attention that is con-
tinually aware of all outer and inner phenomena 
without reacting to them. I can say, however, that I 
never approached this state. 
I thrived in retreats and group meetings, and I 
was asked to do some teaching. But none of this di-
rected work ever seemed to make a difference to how 
I was in the everyday world or to my habitual reac-
tions to situations. In retrospect, in Gurdjieffian 
terms, I was a ―weak yogi‖—the person who ―has 
insights and who can conceptually connect every-
thing with everything… but when one looks at the 
quality of their personal lives, they are just as dumb 
and neurotic as all the rest of us, in spite of saying all 
these incredibly wonderful insightful things‖ [4]. 
Throughout those years, I wrestled with what was 
variously described as ―integrating the teachings‖ or 
―the practice of daily life.‖ Training the mind should 
lead to an enhanced, more malleable capacity to pay 
attention, but in my case it did not. When I was medi-
tating two or three hours a day after long retreats, I 
would feel great clarity during the meditation and 
visualization sessions. I sometimes felt more con-
nected with the world afterward. At other times, 
I 
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however, it was as though I was in an invisible bub-
ble separated from the everyday world and ―not quite 
here.‖ Were my problems in the fields at Blackstone 
part of the same difficulty? 
As I pondered these matters, I was gradually able 
to recognize the different weed species among the 
grass more readily—what is commonly called ―get-
ting your eye in.‖ It‘s not just ―seeing,‖ however. At a 
field day in a local reserve, Bruny Island‘s resident-
expert bird guide, Tonia Cochran, led us on a walk 
into forty-spotted pardalote territory [5]. She listened 
for the elusive birds as intently as she looked. When 
she heard a soft double note that I could barely dis-
tinguish from other chirrups, peeps, and squawks, she 
swung her binoculars and spotted the diminutive ol-
ive form of the pardalote from among the silvery 
green eucalypt leaves. Clearly, you have to activate 
your ear as well as your eye and get both working 
together. As I thought about these well-honed skills 
of the experienced ―birder,‖ I realized that I tended to 
let the soundscape wash over me as an undifferentiat-
ed immersion experience. I rarely listened for par-
ticular clues about the life around me, the ―sound-
signs‖ of their presence.  
 
aying attention does not come naturally to me. 
At primary school, one of my kinder nick-
names was ―Absent-minded Professor‖ be-
cause of the thick glasses I wore from the age of three 
and my tendency to have my mind on things other 
than what was in front of me. I remember native 
plantswoman Desley Kippax first suggesting to me 
that I cut the seed heads off our native powa grasses 
and scatter them on bare ground [6]. 
―When do they go to seed?‖ I asked, reaching for 
my pocket notepad and pen to write it down. 
―Oh, usually December or January, but you don‘t 
need to worry about that—just keep an eye on them, 
you‘ll know.‖ 
I didn‘t trust myself to know so wrote it down an-
yway as an aide memoire. The stalks of mature seeds 
on the powa grass are obvious to me now, but at the 
time I didn‘t have either the eye for them or the trust 
that I ever would. 
A significant part of the process is recognizing 
self-imposed barriers to being more attentive. Over a 
year ago, Vicki pointed out some young weeds above 
the long grass in an area just above our neighbor 
Archie‘s thistle-free paddock. She suggested I spray 
them, but I thought, ―Oh God, I‘ve got my hands full 
of thistle spraying. If I start worrying about every 
weed on this place, I‘ll go crazy. I‘ll just let them 
come and go and it will be all right.‖ 
A month later, Vicki mentioned them again as 
more appeared. To humor her, I spent a morning 
spraying, feeling slightly virtuous for heeding what 
probably wasn‘t a big deal. Thereafter these weeds 
disappeared from my mental consideration. 
The following month I was out in the field when 
Archie drove by in his Land Rover. 
―You‘d better get after that dock that‘s spreading 
through your fields.‖ 
―Oh,‖ I replied, pleased to have the weed identi-
fied by name. ―I‘ve sprayed it already, it should be 
okay.‖  
―I don‘t think so. You‘ve got a whole load of seed 
about to drop. It‘s a nasty seed, too—triangular and it 
spreads everywhere.‖ He was good enough not to say 
that he didn‘t want all that seed washing down onto 
his land, but the implication was clear. 
Archie has been on Bruny Island for 40 years, 
while I have been here for only six, so he has credi-
bility. I walked over to the slope he had mentioned 
and was staggered to see how much dock there was—
luxuriant auburn seed heads ready to burst. When I 
reported this to Vicki, she wasn‘t impressed, consid-
ering the work I‘d have to put into collecting all the 
seed heads, whereas if I had sprayed at her first men-
tion, the plants wouldn‘t have gone to seed at all. We 
agreed that for a man who has spent many years on 
his meditation cushion, I can be remarkably unaware. 
I had plenty of time to reflect as I began the ardu-
ous task of snipping off each of the thousands of seed 
heads with secateurs and placing them in garbage 
bags, taking care not to shake the seeds loose. Rue-
fully, I recalled the old saying, ―There‘s none so blind 
as those who will not see.‖ Because I had resisted the 
notion that there was yet another noxious plant to pay 
heed to, I had not wanted to see the dock and so 
didn‘t register that it was spreading in front of my 
eyes. I chastised myself for spending too much effort 
seeking to maintain the spacious quality of the occa-
sional morning‘s meditation or thinking about the 
subtleties of ―withness action‖ [7] rather than the 
P 
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more prosaic work of attend-
ing to what is physically 
right in front of me [8]. 
The remnants of the 
―bubble‖ I sometimes en-
countered after meditation 
sessions were coming back 
to haunt me. I was grasping 
after that quality of simplici-
ty that so easily dissipated 
when meditation ended. Al-
so I suspect I was still prone 
to the subtle self-inflation 
that was an undercurrent at 
retreats, a sense of special-
ness in undertaking esoteric 
practices for the benefit of 
all sentient beings. 
 
uch ruminations on 
the relationship be-
tween meditation and 
land stewardship sent me 
back to the literature on attention, where I found two 
contrasting emphases. In what I would call the ―dis-
continuity view,‖ held by most commentators, there 
are two distinct kinds of mutually exclusive attention. 
The first kind is called by Philip Novak ordinary at-
tention, which is discursive, intermittent and passive: 
―It is not a quality of mind we bring to experience, 
but something that occurs to us as we become tempo-
rarily interested in some inner or outer phenomena‖ 
[9]. In contrast, commentators speak of contemplative 
attention, which refers to sustained, active, non-
discursive attention often developed as part of rigor-
ous spiritual discipline. In Hubert Benoît‘s view, or-
dinary attention is stuck on its object: ―I am lost, 
identified with what I am doing without being aware 
of why I am doing it, whereas in absolute attention 
we are aware of what we are doing and why‖ [10]. 
A contrasting approach is the ―continuity view,‖ 
which de-emphasizes distinctions among attention 
modes and instead understands attention as a com-
prehensive phenomenon that can lead to a deeper ex-
perience of reality. As William Segal explains, 
―Through the simple act of attending, one initiates a 
new alignment of forces…. [O]pening to the force of 
attention evokes a sense of wholeness and equilibri-
um‖ that moves beyond 
reactive mechanisms and 
distractions. He notes that 
―attention is not mine. Its 
source is surrounded by 
mystery…. [O]ne needs to 
be at the service of con-
scious attention; one pre-
pares for its advent through 
active stillness‖ [11]. 
How is attention to be 
developed? In the disconti-
nuity view, one must first 
recognize the limitations of 
ordinary attention and the 
associated, false self.  Se-
cond, as presented by No-
vak, the automatic process-
es of the false self are 
starved by not reacting pos-
itively or negatively to the 
objects of attention. For 
Benoît, the key is to retain 
awareness of one‘s purpose in any action, in all atten-
tiveness. On the other hand, Segal writes more of the 
process of deepening ordinary attention progressively 
through such means as anchoring the attention in the 
sensations of the body, ―providing it with a kind of 
habitat‖ [12]. 
 
ecause attention is such a diffuse notion, dif-
ferent emphases cannot be taken too far, 
though they became quite relevant as I tried 
to better attend to my daily life at Blackstone. For 
example, in its practice of mindfulness, Buddhism 
makes much of the distinction between ordinary mind 
and what is sometimes described as ―absolute mind,‖ 
―big mind,‖ or ―nature of mind.‖ According to Bud-
dhist master Sogyal Rinpoche, the nature of mind is 
like the sky: ―a primordial, pure, pristine awareness 
that is at once intelligent, cognizant, radiant and al-
ways awake‖ [13]. 
Some Buddhist literature on mindfulness and 
spiritual enlightenment appears aligned with the con-
tinuity perspective on attention. For example, Ste-
phen Batchelor notes that ―to stop and pay attention 
to what is happening is one way of snapping out of 









worries]. It is also a reasonable definition of medita-
tion‖ [14]. He goes on to outline the process of deep-
ening self-awareness that comes with slowly expand-
ing attention to one‘s body sensations, feelings, 
thoughts, and the surrounding world. 
Similarly, the Gurdjieffian system of self-
transformation aims at a balanced development of a 
person‘s physical, emotional, and intellectual capaci-
ties. As Charles Tart explains, Gurdjieff‘s path is 
primarily ―a matter of mindfulness in everyday life‖ 
[15]. Although the Gurdjieffian starting point is simi-
lar to Novak‘s view that ordinarily people are oblivi-
ous much of their waking life, there is emphasis on 
direct attention to bodily sensations as a way of living 
in the present moment rather than recapitulating past 
events or fantasizing about the future. Tart is one of 
the few researchers who has had extensive practical 
experience in both Buddhism and the Gurdjieffian 
system. He concludes that ―I personally find Gurd-
jieff‘s techniques for creating mindfulness in daily 
life much more practical and successful than Bud-
dhist ones‖ [16]. He points out that, though Buddhist 
teachings emphasize mindfulness in daily life, not 
just in meditation, they provide few practical tech-
niques for actualizing meditative presence to every-
day actions and situations. 
 
ccording to the literature, then, I needn‘t feel 
too badly about my struggles with attention, 
meditation, and daily life. The gap between 
what Buddhists call the ―ultimate nature of mind‖ 
and the sad reality of mental habits is integral to hu-
man nature. A key implication of the discontinuity 
view is that little can be done with the sort of rigid, 
limited attention I experienced in the paddocks. Ra-
ther, this is the typical nature of ordinary mind. The 
long process of ceasing to react to whatever phenom-
ena I encounter and not identifying with success or 
failure would be very difficult outside a spiritual tra-
dition. Developing sustained contemplative attention 
would be even more arduous. 
In contrast, the continuity view emphasizes a per-
severing with ordinary attention, whereby bodily 
awareness seems particularly central [17]. When we 
first came to Bruny Island, we had envisaged that we 
would establish a retreat here, with much more time 
for spiritual practice than our previous home offered. 
In retrospect, this was as misguided a hope as my ini-
tial thoughts of leisurely bicycle rides, tennis match-
es, and cricket games. 
What actually happened was, because we were 
living more remotely and self-sufficiently, we faced 
far greater everyday demands that, if met with inat-
tentiveness, led to painful consequences. In other 
words, issues of spirituality and attentiveness have 
much more often involved mundane needs and ac-
tions unfolding in the context of a deepening place 
relationship. This situation raises questions about the 
interaction between place and attention. Does the 
process of re-inhabiting place necessarily require 
closer attention to one‘s surrounds? Is there some-
thing about the very nature and structure of places 
that transforms one‘s attention or one‘s ability to be 
attentive? 
Even at a mundane level, I‘ve noticed how our 
house and its location—a small dwelling with a large 
veranda 40 yards from the ocean shore—affects the 
quality of my attention.  After dinner and dish wash-
ing, I carry the saved rinse water out to the garden 
around the house. Most times, being outside brings 
me to my senses a bit, breaking through my rambling 
thoughts or the world news on our wind-up radio. 
Last night, my attention was focused by tree martins 
shuffling about in their nests in the veranda roof and 
a moonlight shaft piercing storm clouds and illumi-
nating wet, silver trunks of white peppermint trees. 
During the day, if I walk halfway down the path 
to the shore, there‘s a bare, rocky point where my at-
tention is drawn outward over the water and to the 
salt taste of the wind. Down on the shore, my atten-
tion moves to the soundscape of Channel breezes and 
waves. The final transition is into the water for a 
brisk invigorating swim or snorkel. Floating motion-
less on my back, arms widespread, I feel fully im-
mersed and present. Back on the shore, I notice my 
entire skin tingling, and I feel renewed. 
The morning I stopped in the midst of backpack 
spraying points toward another aspect of the spec-
trum of attention. What was required of me that day 
was very close to the Gurdjieffian exercises of sens-
ing and self-remembering. Tart emphasizes the im-
portance of ―simultaneously making the small effort 
of will to keep your attention deliberately divided… 
You never let all of your attention go into listening or 
just into seeing, but keep it divided, just a little bit in 
A 
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touch with your body sensations, the arms and legs, 
looking actively, listening actively‖ [18]. 
To spray effectively and not strain my body, I 
needed to keep my attention divided between several 
different things, staying in touch with the sensations 
in my shoulders and back, as well as keeping track of 
where I was going on the traverse. The structure of 
the paddocks and the distribution of weeds and grass-
es provided the ongoing opportunity to practice the 
sort of multi-focused attention that had previously 
eluded me. Unlike the artificiality of trying to main-
tain in ordinary life something developed in work-
shops or on retreat, this effort is practical and down-
to-earth. Once again, I learn the power of embracing 
necessity [19]. 
 
lackstone has been an ongoing source of in-
spiration. Over the years, my Buddhist prac-
tice has changed from a rigidly regular group 
schedule of meditation, mantra, and visualization to 
an intermittent, essentialized practice on my own. 
There have been occasions, sometimes on the shore 
at first or last light, when a few lines of a daily prayer 
come unbidden into my mind. One evening last 
month, as the setting sun turned the rock pools into 
burnished mirrors and filled the sandstone caves with 
honeyed light, I was stopped in my tracks by the 
stillness. Putting down the oysters just collected, I 
felt weak-kneed and sat on a nearby mushroom-
shaped rock [20]. Spontaneously, I broke into a Bud-
dhist chant. As my voice reverberated in the sand-
stone hollows and traversed the water, I felt I was 
singing out a heartfelt thank you to the Channel‘s 
rocks, waters, and mountains in gratitude for their 
simply being there.  
As the echoes receded and tears flowed, I felt to 
be part of the ongoing processes of this place, doing 
something as natural as the gull‘s mew or the waves‘ 
lapping. Just as the mushroom rock radiated its par-
ticular ―rock-ness‖ and Mount Wellington radiated its 
particular ―mountain-ness,‖ so I sat there radiating 
my own ―human-ness.‖ All three things had an interi-
or aspect, and I felt a sense of spaciousness opening 
up within me and beyond me.  
It might seem odd that I broke into a Buddhist 
chant, given everything I‘ve said about the difficul-
ties of sustained practice. Maybe all I needed was to 
sit quietly in the fading light. The difference is that 
this experience was a spontaneous response to light 
flooding the shore rather than some formalized even-
ing practice. Even if the hours and days spent in med-
itation or on retreat have not directly seemed to 
strengthen daily awareness or contemplative atten-
tion, they have left me with an expressive vocabulary 
and rhythmic chants that this place seems to draw 
forth [21]. 
Attention plays a crucial role in the flux between 
my external perceptions of the place and internal 
states of mind, as I discovered in a very prosaic way 
when backpack spraying. Charles Tart calls it a para-
dox—the more you become aware of your external 
world and your physical body, the more aware you 
become of your inner life [22]. His explanation is 
simple: You don‘t get so caught up in your psycho-
logical reactions, fantasies, hopes, and fears if you 
can keep some space from them by maintaining part 
of your attention on your body and sensing the out-
side world. 
  
erhaps my situation runs deeper. In The Spell 
of the Sensuous, philosopher David Abram de-
scribes a subtle dependence of so-called ―inte-
rior‖ mental phenomena on taken-for-granted aspects 
of the ―exterior‖ world. He quotes Rilke: ―The in-
ner—what is it? If not intensified sky.‖ This depiction 
resonates strongly with the Buddhist conception of 
the skylike nature of mind [23]. In this sense, our 
mental world is inextricably linked with the world in 
which we find ourselves:  ―each terrain seems to have 
its own particular intelligence, the unique vernacular 
of soil and leaf and sky. Each place has its own mind, 
its own psyche… a place-specific intelligence shared 
by all the humans that dwell therein, but also by all 
beings who live and make their way in that 
zone‖[24]. To evoke his own Pacific Northwest ver-
nacular, Abram draws upon ―Douglas fir, red-tailed 
hawk, serpentine in the sandstone, and fog offshore in 
the summer.‖ Following Abram‘s lead, I offer my 
first attempt at a Blackstone vernacular: 
 
A sibilant wind in the casuarinas 
Heron poised at Channel‘s edge in the mist 
The briny seaweed tang of cool air at low tide 
Wedge-tailed eagle, wingtip feathers fully extended, soaring 
upslope 









Mushroom-shaped rocks and the circular sandstone hollows 
they leave 
Scarred grasstree sentinels above the shore 
 
In subsequent work, Abram contends that the in-
strument with which one enters the intelligence of a 
place is not the rational intellect but the whole sens-
ing body. One does not translate the local vernacular 
into verbal language but, rather, attends closely to the 
body‘s response to place: ―The body subtly blends 
itself with every phenomenon it perceives‖ [25]. In 
this way, one enters into mind-at-large—in other 
words, mind not as a human possession but as ―a 
power proper to every part of the elemental field‖ 
[26]. Qualities of thought and even particular 
thoughts can spring from the landscape and creatures 
that live there. 
This way of viewing the mind sheds light on my 
recent glimpse into the inner-ness of rock and moun-
tain. Abram claims that our sense of a unique interior 
mindscape to which each of us alone has access aris-
es from the modernist destruction of the indigenous 
view of the universe as an immense enclosure, a 
―huge interior‖ that humanity inhabited. In the wake 
of the Copernican revolution, Europeans found them-
selves on the outside, in space. Only then did the 
modern idea of the mind as ―a wholly private interi-
or‖ arise [27]. From this perspective, my propensity 
for being outside is, paradoxically, a way of seeking 
the inside of things [28].  
 
elevant here is Simone Weil‘s claim that ―At-
tention taken to its highest degree is the same 
thing as prayer. It presupposes faith and love. 
Absolutely unmixed attention is prayer‖ [29]. Weil 
contrasts attention, requiring an opening of one‘s 
whole being in receptivity, with the work of will, 
which only involves ―a few muscles.‖ After my con-
volutions over meditation, mindfulness, and different 
types of attention, her words feel like a blessing. 
Weil uses strong qualifiers when she writes about 
attention: ―Taken to its highest degree‖ and ―abso-
lutely unmixed attention‖ do not sound like the eve-
ryday attention necessary for washing the dishes or 
spraying thistles. According to the discontinuity view, 
these contrasting modes of attention are indeed two 
different things, though Weil‘s terminology suggests 
more a matter of degree than distinct type. 
In any event, I have already made key choices. I 
no longer spend the recommended hours in medita-
tion each day. I get out to the fields, learning practical 
skills, trying to pay more attention to what I do and 
what happens around me. The continuity view seems 
to resonate more with my experience here, and I feel 
ready to say that really paying attention is prayer—to 
the indwelling spirit in all things and to deep listening 
for the underlying language of this place. As Abram 
explains, prayer springs from the practice of directly 
addressing our animate surroundings, and there is the 
same quality of respectful attention, whether one is 
speaking to a divinity or to the sentient world [30]. 
Having said that, I find much in accordance with 
the discontinuity view. Novak‘s depiction of ordinary 
attention is an accurate account of the mental states I 
commonly encounter, and Benoît‘s emphasis on re-
membering one‘s purpose in bringing attention to 
everyday life is important to me. I‘m not doing it 
simply to do a better job of backpack spraying. Ra-
ther, it‘s a way to help me wake up out from the deep 
―sleep‖ of habitual action and to participate more 
consciously in this place‘s unfolding life. Even this 
effort can be tricky because, if one is not careful, re-
membering one‘s aim can lead to the psychic infla-
tion of a supposedly higher purpose. 
 
‘m left with a new set of questions. How do I de-
velop a robust practice of everyday bodily aware-
ness out of the debris of exercises I have accumu-
lated from years of spiritual practice, yoga, and phys-
iotherapy? How can I discriminate between those 
processes of mindfulness and visualization that pro-
mote attention to daily life, and those that perpetuate 
the bubble of separation and specialness? What bear-
ing does attending more closely to the local place 
vernacular and my subtler bodily responses have on 
our everyday place-making activities here? What 
does it really mean to have one‘s awareness be part of 
something so much larger—a place-specific intelli-
gence shared by all the beings that inhabit Black-
stone? 
I head to the shore after a wild, windy day and 
find myself in a place I don‘t usually go to—a small 
rock shelf beneath a spreading casuarina. The Chan-
nel‘s whitecaps have subsided to a lazy slap and an 
occasional reverberating shudder as a wave comes in 









noon sun has warmed the sandstone. Maybe I need to 
relax more about this matter of attention and hold 
these questions more lightly. It all seems to be point-
ing in the same direction—working with mental habit 
patterns and embracing practical necessity. Embodied 
mind. Emplaced mind. Attention. Remembering my 
aim. Prayer. 
The breeze sighs through the casuarinas. A wave 
slaps the shore. Boom! The heron skims the water‘s 
surface, silhouetted in the late sun. 
 
Notes 
1. The very first encounter was seeing a heron poised on the 
shoreline and the effect this sighting had when we first arrived 
at Blackstone. See my ―First Letter from Far South.‖ This and 
other letters are available at: http://krex.k-
state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522.   
2. Spraying requires relatively calm, dry conditions so spray 
remains on the thistles and isn‘t washed off the leaves. 
3. My life partner Vicki and I have had many conversations 
regarding our experiences of spiritual practice and paying atten-
tion. In 2009, we published a co-authored chapter exploring 
some of these issues; see John Cameron and Victoria King, 
―Spirit Place: Being Present in the Land,‖ in Spirituality, Myth-
opoesis and Learning (Brisbane: Post Pressed Press, 2009), pp. 
197-205. 
4. Charles Tart, Living the Mindful Life (Boston: Shambha-
la, 1994), p. 24. He describes the weak yogi as one who ―knows 
everything and can do nothing.‖ 
5. As described in ―Seventh Letter from Far South,‖ the for-
ty-spotted pardalote is a small endangered bird endemic to 
Bruny Island. 
6. Desley Kippax is an experienced native plantswoman 
and friend– see ―Sixth Letter from Far South.‖. 
7. Used by some commentators on Goethean science, this 
term refers to action taken in partnership with other life forms 
rather than doing things to them—see ―Fifth Letter from Far 
South.‖ 
8. Neuroscientists term this situation ―inattention blind-
ness,‖ which refers to the fact that the brain has a very limited 
supply of attention. Focusing on one thing can make one oblivi-
ous to other things that would otherwise be obvious (see New 
Scientist, vol. 20, December 27, 2008, pp. 43-45). This does not 
imply, however, that nothing that can be done about a lack of 
attention.  
9. Philip Novak, ―The Practice of Attention,‖ Parabola, 
vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), p. 8. 
10. Hubert Benoît, ―Acceptance and Attention,‖ Parabola, 
vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), p. 61. 
11. William Segal, ―The Force of Attention,‖ Parabola, 
vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), p. 77. 
12. Segal, ibid. 
13. Sogyal Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dy-
ing (NY: Random House, 1992), p. 47. 
14. Stephen Batchelor, Buddhism without Beliefs (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1997), p. 59 
15. Tart, p. 35. 
16. Ibid, p. 36. 
17. As well as the sources I‘ve referred to, there is a long 
tradition of thought about bodily awareness within phenomenol-
ogy, starting with Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s Phenomenology of 
Perception (London: Routledge, 1962) and his notion of ―body-
subject.‖ David Abram provides a cogent summary of the inter-
disciplinary study of the embodied mind in Becoming Animal 
(NY: Pantheon, 2010), p. 103-06. 
18. Tart., pp. 56-57. 
19. In ―Fourth Letter from Far South,‖ I wrote of the para-
doxical freedom that arises from accepting necessity, especially 
in regards to our dependence upon the sun and the wind for 
power. 
20. See ―Second Letter from Far South,‖ for a description 
of my encounters with the ―mushroom rocks‖ on the shore. 
21. I recently encountered an account by an eminent Bud-
dhist scholar very much in sympathy with what I had experi-
enced. Stephen Batchelor, author of such classics as Buddhism 
without Beliefs (London: Bloomsbury Press, 1998) and The 
Awakening of the West (Berkeley, CA.: Parallax Press, 1994) 
spent ten years as a Buddhist monk in Tibetan and Korean mon-
asteries. In his most recent book Confessions of a Buddhist 
Atheist (NY: Spiegel & Grau, 2010), he describes how he pro-
gressively became disenchanted with the orthodoxies of belief 
and unproductive practices in both traditions. After many years 
of dedicated practice, he describes himself ironically as ―a Bud-
dhist failure,‖ noting at one point that all the visualizations and 
mantras he had been doing ―had no discernible effect on the 
quality of my lived experience‖ (p. 55). 
22. Tart, p. 77. 
23. Rainer Maria Rilke, quoted in David Abram, The Spell 
of the Sensuous, p. 262.  
24. Abram, 1997, p. 262. 
25. Abram, 2010, p. 251. 
26. Ibid, p. 216. 
27. Ibid, p.155. 
28. I don‘t mean to imply here that finding ―the inside of 
things‖ is simply a matter of returning to some quasi-indigenous 
state, for that would be neither possible nor desirable. However, 
as I commented in my previous essay on ―the gift‖ (―Seventh 
Letter from Far South‖), one can gain inspiration from a differ-
ent worldview and seek to apply it within one‘s own cultural 
context. In this regard, I have also drawn on ideas arising in the 
Western philosophical tradition, such as phenomenology and 
Goethe‘s bildung, the schooling of the intuition and the senses, 
which seem to be pointing in a similar direction (see ―Second‖ 
and ―Fifth Letter from Far South‖). 
29. Simone Weil, ―Attention and Will,‖ in Gravity and 
Grace (London: Routledge, 1952). 
30. Abram, 2010, p. 170. 
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